Concepts and conceptual understanding: What are we talking about? by Sands, David
7OPINION PIECEConcepts and conceptual
understanding: what are we
talking about?
David Sands
Department of Physics and Mathematics, University of Hull, UKCorresponding author:
David Sands, Department of Physics and Mathematics,
University of Hull, Cottingham Rd, Hull, East Yorkshire
HU6 7RX, UK
Email: D.Sands@hull.ac.uk
© 2014 D. Raine,
The Higher Education AcademyAbstract
The words concept and conceptual understanding
are two words used frequently by physics
educators, yet there is no satisfactory definition of
either in the literature. In this article I discuss my
own ideas of what these phrases imply for the
practice of physics and physics education. I suggest
that the word ‘conceptual’ is commonly used to
imply qualitative reasoning. Although this seems
to involve the use of simple relationships, this kind
of reasoning is actually far from simple. It requires
the coordination of seemingly disparate areas of
knowledge and I argue that it is not always easy
to distinguish between a misconception, or a false
concept, and a failure to reason correctly.
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When I first became interested in physics education
research, around 2002, I wondered to what extent
the findings applied to the UK. This was, after all,
a movement that originated in the USA, where the
educational system is very different. Were the
results as universal as the literature claimed or
were they dependent to some extent on the
educational system? This question seems to have
been answered quite effectively within the last
couple of years. Although never published, staff at
the Institute of Physics interviewing graduates
from across the UK for Teacher Scholarships have
observed the same sort of conceptual difficulties
shown by students in the US. I am not entirely
surprised. I have been using the Force Concept
Inventory for the past six years or so and have
direct evidence that students entering my ownNDIR, Vol 10, Issue 1 (June 2014)
doi:10.11120/ndir.2014.00030
Concepts and conceptual understanding8department held at least some of the common
misconceptions identified by physics education
researchers over a number of years.
The idea that students hold misconceptions that
are persistent and resistant to change has exerted
a powerful influence over much of science
education research. Misconceptions have been
variously labelled as alternative conceptions, naïve
conceptions or pre-conceptions, especially if they
relate to mechanics, because it is well established
that many such non-scientific ideas are developed
in childhood as we make sense of the world.
However, much of the literature seems to portray
the idea that conceptions are either naïve or correct.
This stark dichotomy would seem to be at odds
with what many in higher education would consider
to be a normal picture: that students can, and do,
form incorrect associations and develop incorrect
ideas. These are undoubtedly misconceptions in as
much as students have misconceived the ideas
taught to them, but they are formed as a direct
consequence of the instruction received.
Misconceptions research has led directly to an
educational agenda on conceptual change
dominated by the idea that misconceptions should
be replaced by correct conceptions. Much of
misconceptions research is therefore about
identifying more and more misconceptions so that
we can design effective replacement strategies.
One such strategy revolves around cognitive
conflict: the idea that we induce some kind of
conflict between what students think and what the
expert knows and thinks so that students will give
up their misconceptions in favour of the expert
view. Smith and Rochelle (Smith et al. 1993), along
with Andrea di Sessa, a psychologist in the USA
whose ideas have been very influential among the
physics education community, have called this view
into question. They argue that not only does
it effectively devalue students’ ideas, as we must
necessarily adopt the stance that we, as experts,
are right and they, as students, are wrong, but it is
also incompatible with the constructivist view of
learning as a gradual process of constructing
knowledge in which competing ideas often sit side
by side. It is not surprising then that there are
some who believe the term ‘misconception’ to be
inappropriate and advocate that we should move
away from this notion.
It is nearly 20 years since Smith’s paper was
published, but the views he cautions against are
still prevalent. Part of the difficulty, it would
appear, is the lack of satisfactory definitions in the
literature. Whilst misconceptions provide something
very definite to focus on, there is no accepted idea
of what is meant by conceptual understanding or
even a concept. Although both terms are widely© 2014 D. Raine,
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them that makes it difficult to place misconceptions
and the research around them on a theoretical
footing. Perhaps it is for this reason that
Lillian McDermott (2001) preferred the term
‘functional understanding’ , which she defined as
connoting the ability to apply knowledge in contexts
other than that in which it was attained. This
probably comes closest to what most people would
understand by conceptual understanding. It is
common to find students being able to tell us this or
that correctly and with confidence but unable to
apply that knowledge and if knowledge cannot be
applied to what extent is it really understood?
There is a considerable body of work on concepts
in the literature, but it lies firmly within either the
psychological or philosophical traditions. I have
been deeply impressed by Nancy Nerssessian’s
work on creating scientific concepts through
model-based reasoning (Nersessian 2008), but her
description of a concept as a category didn’t
resonate with me. It was not until I read Edouard
Machery’s book, Doing Without Concepts (Machery
2009), that I realised that this is essentially the
standard view of concepts. From a philosophical
perspective the notion of concept-as-category
makes sense. If we want to know whether
something is a bird or not, to take an example,
we have to have a clear idea of what it means to
be a bird and one way of doing this is to create a
category. However, I am not sure that it makes
sense to do the same with physics concepts like
force, acceleration, velocity, atom or electron. For
the last in particular, how we think about it will
depend on the situation. Sometimes it will seem
like a point particle, at other times like a wave
packet and at other times something else. Does
that mean we have one concept that embraces
all these possibilities or do we have multiple
conceptions and choose one to suit
the circumstances?
Is it important to be able to define what we
mean by a concept in physics? I believe so for
two reasons. First, if we don’t know what a concept
is, how can we be sure that the programme of
replacing misconceptions by correct concepts is a
sensible approach? Secondly, language is important
as it reflects our thinking. What strikes me strongly
about concepts and conceptual understanding is
that common usage by physicists, even within the
educational literature, seems to imply something
different from the formal ideas of concepts as
categories. The word ‘conceptual’ in physics usually
implies a qualitative, as opposed to mathematical,
approach, but qualitative reasoning does not
always feature strongly within accounts of
conceptual understanding.NDIR, Vol 10, Issue 1 (June 2014)
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class as a concept (di Sessa, 1998) addresses these
issues. The coordination class is not an elegant
construction: the name suggests something from
object-oriented programming and with phrases like
‘input’ and ‘read out’ , it looks like something a
programmer would come up with. That aside, the
name is intended to reflect the idea that to apply a
concept it is necessary to coordinate several other
items of related knowledge. Coordination in this
sense does involve qualitative reasoning, but as di
Sessa himself acknowledged, his proposal looks
more like a model of understanding than a concept.
This idea of coordination does lead to a crucial
insight, however: a concept is usually tested within
some kind of context and this must inevitably
require knowledge of other concepts. Does it make
sense, therefore, to think about understanding of a
concept in isolation? Is conceptual understanding
context-dependent? My own researches on the
Force Concept Inventory (FCI) have shown that
students who appear to understand a concept in
one situation can fail to apply the same reasoning
in another, even within the same test. For a
number of years now I have asked students at the
start of the academic year to complete the FCI
and during the last three years I have also asked
additional questions to gain some insight into
some of their responses. Last year I asked for a
statement of Newton’s three laws of motion and
quite a number expressed the Third Law in terms
of the force of an object A acting on an object B
being equal and opposite to the force of B on A.
Bearing in mind that students had done very little
physics since finishing their A-levels some three or
four months earlier, this could be considered to
be fairly firm knowledge. Yet, when presented
with a problem of a car pushing on a truck, which
would seem to be a good example of an object
A acting on B, many of these same students chose
to apply Newton’s Second Law rather than the
Third. There was a clear association in this and other
answers of net force with acceleration, but on a
problem in which a box being pushed along
a floor at constant speed is subjected to an
increased force, and which should accelerate in
consequence, the majority rejected the Second
Law answer in favour of something unphysical,
namely that the box should reach a constant speed
at some point.
As part of the same test I asked the students to
state explicitly what happened to the resistive
force in this question and some of them correctly
identified that it remains constant. After sifting
through the responses I was left with a small
number of students who could apply the Second
Law in a number of situations and had all the
necessary knowledge to recognise that a net force© 2014 D. Raine,
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but who nonetheless thought the box would
reach a constant speed. There is no discernible
misconception at work here. It seems instead that
some intuitive response has been invoked that
prevented reasoning about the problem. As a test
of understanding this question tells us only
that students are not applying Newtonian
principles, but had I not probed deeper into the
answers I would have concluded erroneously that
there is something about the Second Law or
friction that these students do not understand.
This raises a more general question: when we ask
students solve problems or answer questions
designed to test understanding, what exactly are
we assessing? Undoubtedly students will have
false conceptions, whether naïve or otherwise, and
sometimes these will underlie an incorrect solution,
but in so far as such questions involve reasoning,
which also involves coordinating disparate
elements of knowledge, how do we know that we
are not observing a failure to reason correctly? The
short answer is that we do not, but it raises the
question in my mind as to whether we should
be trying to teach our students how to think
conceptually as much as teach them physics.
Nersessian has put forward the idea that
concepts are created through the process of iconic,
analogic modelling, or model-based reasoning.
I came across an example of this a couple of
years ago. It was an interview presented by
Scherr & Wittman (2002) with ‘Sarah’ , who was
described as an advanced physics student,
discussing electrical conduction. A transcript
of the full interview was available but unfortunately
seems to have been deleted as the institutional
website was updated. Nevertheless, a substantial
proportion of the interview has been published for
those who are interested (Wittmann & Scherr, 2002).
This interview attracted my attention because the
interviewee, Sarah, develops a misconception
about electrical conduction in metals. As described
above, this is not the kind of misconception
normally discussed within the physics education
literature. Although the concept Sarah develops is
incorrect it is a concept nonetheless and what we
are seeing, in fact, is the creation of concepts
essentially as described by Nersessian. The fact that
it is an incorrect concept allows us to see the direct
link between the final concept and her lack of
knowledge, which extends to several aspects of
the basic physics. She refers in places to an
inductor when she clearly means an insulator, and
she seems to have no understanding of the
metallic bond.
In consequence Sarah struggles to explain why a
metal behaves differently from an insulator, likeNDIR, Vol 10, Issue 1 (June 2014)
doi:10.11120/ndir.2014.00030
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After some prompting and discussion, she focuses
on what happens to the electrons inside the
material. She has what seems to be a very strong
notion that electrons within the metal are tightly
bound to atoms and require energy to be released.
When asked about the current flowing in two
identical wires at different temperatures, Sarah
settles on the notion that at higher temperatures
there will be more energy in the system and
concludes that current in a metal will increase with
temperature because “more electrons can be torn
away”. Having arrived at this conclusion, Sarah
thinks about it a little and then re-affirms her view
in what seems to her to be a moment of revelation:
“I didn’t know why I didn’t get the connection
between the higher energy and the electrons being
freed, but that’s what I’m going with”. Sarah has
now developed a misconception about the nature
of current flow in metals; current increases with
increasing temperature.
Sarah seems to have been led to this misconception
by her lack of basic knowledge, not only about
electronic conduction in solids, but also, it seems,
about solids in general. Both of the ideas she
invokes, namely that electrons are bound to atoms
and that the effect of a high temperature is to
cause more electrons to be freed from these atoms,
might apply in other circumstances but not to the
situation under discussion. Thus, reasoning from
insecure knowledge, she has to come up with a
plausible reason as to why electrons in the metal
should be free to move. Upon realising that free
electrons are needed, she could have questioned
her own assumption that electrons are bound, but
she seems to have had no doubts about this.
Consequently she develops an incorrect view of
electrical conduction in metals which seems to be
reinforced upon reflection. Even though she refers
elsewhere in the interview to vibrating “structures”,
apparently meaning atoms, she appears to have no
knowledge of phonons and their role in resistance,
or, if she does, it doesn’t feature in the interview.
What stands out to me is that the chain of
reasoning is entirely qualitative. Sarah uses simple
relationships, such as electrons being tightly bound
to atoms or that the number of bound electrons
decreases with temperature, to develop a model
of electrical conduction in which electrons are torn
away from their parent atoms. By model, I mean
here not just a representation, which of course all
models are, but also an explanatory mechanism.
That her model is incorrect is not a consequence
of the simplicity of her description, as she could
just have easily described the relationship between
temperature and the number of phonons or the
presence of phonons and scattering to arrive at
the correct conclusion that current decreases with© 2014 D. Raine,
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for two reasons: first, those relationships she uses
are incorrect and, secondly, there are others that
she should have used but didn’t, such as the
relationship between phonons and resistance.
There is good reason to suppose that the kind of
mental model that Sarah has created should be
simple. It might be a gross simplification of what is
undoubtedly a complex psychological construction
to think of working memory only in terms of a
limited capacity system, but it is well documented
that the brain can only hold and operate on a
limited number of separate facts or ideas (Glaser
1992). Experts can seem to hold more, as judged
by simple recall tasks, but in fact associations
between the elements in working memory and
deep knowledge structures in long term memory
are being triggered, thereby giving the impression
that more things are being recalled. It is possible,
quite likely even, that experts will use simple
relationships when constructing qualitative
arguments, as that is all the working memory
will allow without some form of
external representation.
There are, of course, more detailed aspects to
these relationships, such as their mathematical
expression. This kind of detail is certainly needed
when solving problems or constructing a detailed
model, but arguably it is not needed at the
qualitative, or conceptual, level at which Sarah is
operating as it would represent an extra load on
the working memory. It seems to me, therefore,
that these qualitative relationships are ideal
candidates for concepts in physics. They
correspond to the every-day use of the term and
would appear to have a psychological validity.
If Nersessian is correct about model-based
reasoning, and I believe she is, then students could
be engaged in the process of constructing and
consolidating concepts whenever they think about
the physics they have been taught. Inevitably,
as with Sarah, some of those concepts will be
incorrect. In this sense conceptual understanding
could be considered to be a fluid state that is
constantly evolving, but testing that understanding
is by no means straight forward. I have shown
that what students might say about concepts in
isolation can differ from how they use them. To
use di Sessa’s terminology, knowledge has to be
coordinated and, depending on the context, the
deeper structure of the concepts, or relationships,
might also need to be invoked. These are two
distinct processes, but they are both important
and together they suggest an educational agenda
in which process is just as important as content.
By all means focus on misconceptions where we
can identify them, but we need to teach studentsNDIR, Vol 10, Issue 1 (June 2014)
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Sands 11to reason qualitatively as well as quantitatively
and, above all, to evaluate their knowledge. I don’t
think we will ever stop students developing© 2014 D. Raine,
The Higher Education Academymisconceptions, but if we can teach them how
to recognise when their reasoning is inconsistent
I would consider that a significant step forward.References
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